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Abstract
Coordination games arise very often in studies of industrial organization and in-
ternational trade. This type of games has multiple strict equilibria, and therefore
the identification of testable predictions is very difficult. We study a vertical prod-
uct differentiation model with two asymmetric players choosing first qualities and
then prices. This game has two equilibria for some parameter values. However,
we apply the risk dominance criterion suggested by Harsanyi and Selten and show
that it always selects the equilibrium where the leader is the firm having some ini-
tial advantage. We then perform an experimental analysis to test whether the risk
dominance prediction is supported by the behaviour of laboratory agents. We show
that the probability that the risk dominance prediction is right depends crucially on
the degree of asymmetry of the game. The stronger the asymmetries the higher the
predictive power of the risk dominance criterion.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze a vertical product differentiation model where two firms
first decide on the quality they want to bring to the market and then choose prices.
This model endogenously gives rise to a “leader” and a “follower”, the former be-
ing the firm with higher quality and profit at equilibrium (product market compe-
tition prevents firms from choosing the same quality at equilibrium).
If the firms are different, the magnitude of the initial asymmetry (on whose nature
we say more below) is crucial in determining the outcome of the game. When a
firm has a strong enough initial advantage over the rival the only possible equilib-
rium is one where the leader at the equilibrium will be the firm which enjoys the
advantage. However, when initial asymmetries are not too large, the game admits
two possible equilibria. The first where the leader is the firm enjoying the initial
advantage, and the second where the leader the firm starting with an initial disad-
vantage.
Several interpretations for this model and for the initial asymmetries are possible.
For instance, firms might differ in the technology available to them, so that the
initial advantage would consist of a lower cost of carrying out the research and de-
velopment activities necessary to improve the quality of the good. Another inter-
pretation is that the firms differ in their initial quality levels (which we can think
of as historically given) and they have to incur some adjustment costs to update
the quality of their product up to the desired level. Under the latter interpretation,
the model gives some insights about the extent to which a current leader (the firm
starting with the higher initial quality) will be able to persist as the industry leader,
or whether the initial advantage can be overturned, with the initial follower estab-
lishing itself as the top quality firm at the equilibrium.
Whatever the nature and interpretation which might be given to the asymmetries,
one could wonder whether the result that when initial asymmetries are not too large
the leader cannot be predicted survives the application of some equilibrium selec-
tion criteria. Standard criteria of selection among multiple equilibria (such as per-
fectness, properness, strategic stability and Pareto dominance) have no selective
power in the game we study. For this reason we resort to the concept of risk dom-
inance proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). We apply this criterion and we
show that risk dominance unambiguously selects the leader. Indeed, the equilib-
rium where the leader is the firm which enjoys an initial advantage always risk
dominates the other equilibrium, independently of the magnitude of the advantage.
Nevertheless, when the firms are identical risk dominance does not select a leader.
The presence of such discontinuity (unambiguous selection for small asymmetries
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but no selection for symmetric firms) suggests that we should be cautious in ap-
plying the result when the initial asymmetries are small. As we will see later, the
experimental analysis supports this view.
To test the prediction of the risk dominance criterion we have performed experi-
ments on a leadership game derived from our vertical product differentiationmodel.
Since we wanted to concentrate on the equilibrium selection problem we designed
a game that shares the characteristics of the theoretical model proposed but whose
structure was easier to understand by the experimental subjects. We used a game
in which only two actions are available to each player, thus proposing a strong
discretization of the strategy space (the continuum in the original differentiation
model), and the payoffs are those of the equilibrium strategies (suitably renormal-
ized) for the differentiation model. The resulting game is a version of the Battle of
the Sexes, or Chicken, 11 with different degrees of asymmetry (see Table 1; matrix
1 is symmetric, while matrices 2 to 6 show increasing asymmetries in payoffs).
The main hypotheses we tested were whether the equilibrium where the firm with
initial advantage is the leader, or the equilibrium where the disadvantaged firm be-
comes the leader were selected by the subjects in this game, and whether the an-
swer depends on the initial degree of asymmetry. Since the equilibrium with lead-
ership by the firm with an advantage is risk dominant this can be viewed addition-
ally as a test of the empirical relevance of risk dominance as an equilibrium selec-
tion criterion. We were also interested in how the agents adjust their play towards
an equilibrium and whether play converges or not. This could serve to elucidate
whether the evolutionary models that have suggested risk dominance as an equi-
librium selection criterion are useful in explaining the facts.
The experimental results support the hypothesis that leadership by the firm with an
advantage is the result one should expect more often and therefore gives support
for the use of risk dominance as an equilibrium selection criterion in this type of
games. But this support has to be qualified in the following sense: what we find
is that the actions leading to the risk dominant equilibrium are chosen more often
than the alternative actions, but they are not always chosen. Furthermore, the fre-
quency of the risk dominant outcome is much higher than the alternatives when
the asymmetry is large but only marginally so as the asymmetry becomes smaller.
We also tested different learning protocols and we found that fictitious play does
a worse job at explaining the data than unsophisticated stimulus-response models
which turn out to be related to evolutionary processes. In addition to their intrinsic
game theoretic interest, we wanted to evaluate different learning rules in this game
1One can find discussions of such games in any standard game theory textbook, like Binmore
(1992) or Gibbons (1992)
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because some recent research (Kandori, Mailath and Rob 1993, Young 1993) has
shown that under evolutionary learning processes risk dominant equilibria will be
played more often than the other equilibria.
We also find that observed play does not show a strong tendency towards conver-
gence. Although miscoordination is to be expected in a coordination game like
the one we are analyzing at the beginning of play (and in the absence of strong fo-
cal points), this is a bit surprising when it lasts for 25 to 30 periods.2 But it is less
surprising when one considers that the agents’ information about history consisted
only of the outcomes from the games they had played in, and since they were ran-
domly matched each period there was no obvious “correlation device” they could
use, not even history, since different players had different histories which were un-
known to each other.
Our paper is related to two different strands of the economic literature. The first
is the wide literature in industrial organisation and international trade which aims
at establishing conditions under which asymmetries between firms and between
countries tend to widen or shrink over time. This problem has been studied un-
der many points of view, and with different answers. As an example, we can cite
patent race models (see e.g. Reinganum, 1985, in a partial equilibrium model, and
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, in a general equilibrium model with innovation and
growth), learning-by-doingmodels (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988) or switching-cost
models (Farrell and Shapiro, 1988). A recent treatment in a dynamic model of a
duopolistic industry with sufficiently general features has been provided by Budd,
Harris and Vickers (1993). Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993), Flam and Help-
man (1987) and Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1997) study the problem from an in-
ternational perspective, and model situations where latecomers can overtake coun-
tries starting from a higher level of development.
The other branch of the literature to which our paper is connected is the experi-
mental literature on coordination games. The closest analog to our experiments we
have found is Guyer and Rapoport (1972). They studied a number of 2× 2 games,
and among them there was an asymmetric version of Chicken. They find that the
actions leading to the maximin equilibrium in that game are selected more often
than the others and that the frequency of these choices increases with the asym-
metry of the payoffs. Their results are consistent with ours in the sense that the
maximin equilibrium in that game is also the risk dominant equilibrium so the risk
dominant equilibrium is chosen more often. However, the fact that in their exper-
iment, unlike in ours, the risk dominant equilibrium is also the maximin equilib-
rium, makes it difficult to assess if the result is due to risk dominance or to max-
2See v.g. Friedman (1996).
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imin. One has to remember that at the time those experiments were performed the
concept of risk dominance was not known, so there was little reason to conduct
the experiments with games that separated risk dominance from maximin as we
do. Another closely related experimental paper is Friedman (1996). He studies
convergence to equilibrium in a variety of 2× 2 games, including an asymmetric
version of the Battle of the Sexes. He finds that players converge to playing equi-
librium profiles a large percentage of the times, but he does not report to which
equilibria. One important difference with our design is that he does not vary the
degree of asymmetry in the payoffs.
Other previous experimental research on similar games has tended to focus on sym-
metric games. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1989) run experiments with
the symmetric Battle of the Sexes with preplay communication to test Farrell’s
(1987) theory of cheap talk and equilibrium selection. They show that communi-
cation, especially the one-sided variety, is an empirically useful equilibrium selec-
tion device. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1993) do experiments with the
symmetric Battle of the Sexes plus an outside option (thus the complete game is
not symmetric) to test forward induction as an equilibrium selection device. They
show that the outside option does influence the outcome of the game but that this
is not solely due to forward induction but also a consequence of the creation of
a focal point through the asymmetry of the game. Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil
(1990) study a symmetric coordination game with 7 strategies (levels of effort),
where all the homogeneous strategy profiles are equilibria. They find that the risk
dominant equilibrium (the minimum effort)3 is eventually played by all subjects,
even though it is the most inefficient of all equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the theoretical model
with asymmetric players and multiple equilibria, while in section 3 we discuss the
selection concept of risk dominance. In section 4 we present the experiment de-
sign. The results are summarized in section 5, and some learning models are tested
in section 6. Concluding remarks are presented in section 7.
2 The model
Let us consider a version of the vertical product differentiation model in the tra-
dition of Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Mussa and Rosen (1978). We assume a
population of consumers who have utility function U = θu − p if they buy one
3Sacco (1996) shows that the equilibrium with all agents playing the minimum effort in this
game is risk dominant.
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unit of the differentiated good and U = 0 if they do not buy. The symbols u and
p stand for quality and price of the good, and θ represents a taste parameter. We
assume the distribution of θ to be uniform with θ ∈ [0, θ¯] and a density S.
We assume that there exist two firms in the industry, A and B. In the first period
of the game they decide on the quality they want to produce uj and incur a fixed
(i.e. independent of the quantity produced) cost of quality Fj = k j u
2
j
2 , with j =
A, B. The cost of quality can be thought of as R&D investments or advertising
outlays. The quadratic form we have taken is a standard assumption which greatly
simplifies the calculations. Any convex function would give the same qualitative
results. Note that the two firms do not necessarily have the same technology: firm
A is at least as efficient as firm B, with 1 = kA ≤ kB = k. Therefore, the parameter
k is a measure of the asymmetry existing between the two firms. We take marginal
production costs to be constant and, without loss of generality, we set them equal
to zero.
In the second and final stage of the game, firms decide on the price at which they
want to sell their product. We work as usual by backward induction, and solve the
last stage of the game first.
We first find the demand schedules faced by the top and bottom quality firm re-
spectively as:
q1 = S
(
θ¯− p1 − p2
u1 − u2
)
, q2 = S
(
p1 − p2
u1 − u2 −
p2
u2
)
,
where u1 ≥ u2. It is then straightforward to derive the first order conditions, com-
pute the price equilibrium and check that profits at the price equilibrium for the top
and low quality are:
1 = 4u
2
1(u1 − u2)Sθ¯2
(4u1 − u2)2 , 2 =
u1u2(u1 − u2)Sθ¯2
(4u1 − u2)2 .
At the first stage of the game, the net profit functions for the firms are given by
π1 =1 − k j u
2
1
2 , and π2 =2 − ki
u22
2 , with j, i = A, B and j 	= i.
Note that we have deliberately not specified which firm is producing the top and
which the bottom quality, since either firm can be the high (low) quality provider
at equilibrium. Indeed, there might exist two equilibria in pure strategies (we do
not consider mixed strategies here). In the first one, it is the more efficient firm A
which produces the top quality. In the second, it is the less efficient firm B. We now
turn to the characterization of both equilibria, and to the analysis of their existence.
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2.1 The more efficient firm produces the high quality
If the top quality firm is the one with lower costs of quality production (firm A),
the first-order conditions of the problem are:
u1 = 4Sθ¯2 4u
2
1 − 3u1u2 + 2u22
4(4u1 − u2)3 ≡ φ(u1,u2 ), (1)
ku2 = Sθ¯2u21
4u1 − 7u2
4(4u1 − u2)3 ≡ µ(u1,u2 ). (2)
By dividing the two equations above, rearranging and writing u1 = ru2 with r ≥ 1
we obtain:
u2
3(4r3 − 16kr2 − 7r2 + 12kr − 8k) = 0. (3)
The only meaningful root for this equation is:
rA = 7+ 16k12 +
49+ 80k + 256k2
12(g(k) + 24√3kh(k))1/3 +
(g(k) + 24√3kh(k))1/3
12
,
where: g(k) = 343+ 2568k+ 1920k2 + 4096k3; h(k) = 686+ 2967k+ 3552k2 +
5888k3.
Note that ∂π2
∂u2
= 0 can be written as: u2 = Sθ¯2 r2(4r−7)(4r−1)3 . By replacing r with rA, we
obtain u∗2 and u∗1 = rAu∗2 as functions of k only (the term Sθ¯2 has just a scale effect
throughout).
Figure 1 (left-hand panels) depicts the qualities and profits for this candidate equi-
librium E1(u∗1,u∗2 ), where the top quality is provided by the more efficient firm A.
Note that the top quality makes considerably higher profits than the low quality
firm.
2.2 The less efficient firm produces the top quality
If firm B were the top quality firm, the first-order conditions of the problem would
be:
ku1 = φ(u1,u2 ), (4)
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u2 = µ(u1,u2 ). (5)
Let us write u1 = zu2 (with z ≥ 1) and use the same procedure followed in the
previous section to derive the solution. We can then find the value zB which satis-
fies the first-order conditions, and by substitution the solution E2 = (u∗∗1 ,u∗∗2 ). For
completeness, we report here the value zB which is:
zB = 7k + 1612k +
256+ 80k + 49k2
12k(l(k) + 24k√3m(k))1/3 +
(l(k)+ 24k√3m(k))1/3
12k ,
where: l(k)= 4096+1920k+2568k2+343k3; m(k)= 5888+3552k+2967k2+
686k3.
Figure 1 (right-hand panels) reports qualities and profits at this candidate solution.
Note that the two pairs of candidate solutions have been obtained under the hy-
pothesis that no firm can deviate from the quality it has been assigned. For in-
stance, in the first case the candidate solution E1 was found under the hypothesis
that firm A produces the top quality, and firm B the bottom quality. But to make
sure that the pair (u∗1,u∗2 ) is really an equilibrium, we also have to check that firm
B does not find it profitable to ’leapfrog’ the rival and provide a quality higher
than (u∗1 ). In other words, it must be checked that there exists no quality u′1 such
that π′1(u′1,u2 = u∗1) ≥ π∗2(u∗1,u∗2 ). Likewise, it must be checked that firm A does
not have an incentive to deviate by supplying a quality which is lower than u∗2.
Indeed, it is possible to show that these deviations are not profitable, and there-
fore conclude that the pair (u∗1,u∗2 ) is always an equilibrium (see Motta, Thisse
and Cabrales, 1997, for an illustration in a similar model). The discussion below
should give more insight about this result.
The same exercise must be made for the second case, where firm B produces the
top quality. However, it turns out that this is not an equilibrium for all the values
of the parameters. Indeed, there exist high enough values of parameter k (to be
precise, k = 1.5894 is approximately the threshold value above which this equi-
librium collapses) for which the more efficient firm finds it profitable to produce
a quality u′1 higher than the quality u∗∗1 the rival would produce at the candidate
solution. In other words, π′1(u′1,u2 = u∗∗1 ) can be higher than π∗∗2 (u∗∗1 ,u∗∗2 ), as can
be seen from figure 2.
To understand why this equilibrium breaks down when technological asymmetries
are large enough, consider the extreme case where firm B is infinitely inefficient.
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If k tends to infinity, then firm B will choose a top quality u∗∗1 = , with  arbitrar-
ily small, since a huge investment must be made even to produce even a very low
quality. At the candidate equilibrium, firm B is making infinitesimally small prof-
its, and firm A’s profits are even lower (the bottom quality firm always makes less
profit). It is then clear that the latter firm has an incentive to deviate from the can-
didate equilibrium. At a small cost, it can produce a quality higher than , become
the top firm and earn higher profits.
2.3 Equivalent models
We have seen above an example of a model which gives rise to two possible equi-
libria with asymmetric payoffs, and of which only one is risk-dominant across all
the values of the parameters. However, there exist many other possible examples
of vertical product differentiation models which share the same basic features.
Consider for instance the following variation of the model presented above. Firms
have exactly the same technologies (k = 1 for both), but when the game starts the
firms have inherited different levels of quality (which can be interpreted as the con-
sequence of past levels of R&D or advertising expenditures). In the first period of
the game, they can update the quality of the good by incurring some adjustment
costs; in the second period, they compete on prices.
Two equilibria might arise: one where the firm endowed with the larger initial qual-
ity will still be producing the higher quality at the new equilibrium (persistence of
dominance) and one where it is the initial laggard firm which provides the high
quality (leapfrogging); the latter equilibrium ceases to exist when the difference
in initial quality levels is too large, and it is always risk-dominated by the former
equilibrium. This model has been analyzed, in an international trade context by
Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1997)4
3 Risk dominance
The game played by two firms in the context of a vertical product differentiation
model we described above has two strict Nash equilibria, for a range of values of
the parameter k. Standard refinements like perfectness, properness, or strategic
stability do not select among strict Nash equilibria. Also, in this game there are no
symmetric equilibria for k > 1 and no equilibrium Pareto dominates the other (tak-
4See also Cabrales and Motta (1996) for another model with very similar features.
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ing into account only the welfare of the players, the firms; and not the consumers).
There is a solution concept that selects between equilibria in our game, though, and
this is the concept of risk-dominance introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
In the first subsection we will define the concept of risk-dominance for 2×2 games,
which we will use in the experiments, and we will show that risk dominance se-
lects the equilibrium where the firm with the low cost of quality is the leader when
only two quality levels (the equilibrium ones, as in the experimental design) are
possible. In the second subsection we define risk dominance for games with more
strategies and we show that risk dominance also selects the equilibrium where the
firm with the lower cost of quality is the leader in a game with a less coarse dis-
cretization of the strategy space of the theoretical game in the previous section.
3.1 Risk dominance in the 2× 2 game
To motivate the concept of risk dominance consider the following game, which has
two strict equilibria in pure strategies, (U1,U2 ) and (V1,V2 ), and and its discussion
by Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p.82),
U2 V2
U1 99,49 0,0
V1 0,0 1,51
“If player 1 expects that player 2 will choose U2 with probability of
more than 0.01 it is better for him to choose U1. Only if player 2 chooses
V2 with a probability at least 0.99, player 1’s strategy will be the more
profitable. In this sense U1 is much less risky than V1. Now let us look
at the situation of player 2. His strategy V2 is the better one if he ex-
pects player 1 to select V1 with a probability of more than 0.49, and U2
is preferable if he expects U1 with a probability greater than 0.51. In
terms of these numbers V2 seems slightly less risky than U2. It is obvi-
ous that player 1’s reason to select U1 rather than V1 is much stronger
than player 2’s reason to select V2 rather than U2.”
The reasoning is that the equilibrium point (U1,U2 ) involves the less “risky” choice
for 1, and the equilibrium (V1,V2 ) involves the less “risky” choice for player 2. If
the “riskiness” for the two players pointed to the same equilibrium the reasons for
selection would be clearer, but their point is that even when this is not so, one can
still select between the equilibria by weighting in some way the two players’ risk
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motives. The concept of risk dominance is a way to make precise this type of rea-
soning. This criterion compares the product of gains from correct predictions and
the equilibrium with the largest product is the one that risk dominates.
Let a 2× 2 game with the following payoff matrix.
B0 B1
A0 a00,b00 a01,b01
A1 a10,b10 a11,b11
where the payoffs are such that E0 = (A0, B1 ) and E1 = (A1, B0 ) are strict Nash
equilibria5, and let LA0 = a01 − a11. LA0 is the gain made by player A by pre-
dicting rightly that the other player will play as in E0 (and best responding to the
prediction) instead of predicting wrongly that the other player will play as in E1
(and best responding to the prediction). Similarly, let LB0 = b01 − b00. LA1 =
a10 − a00. LB1 = b10 − b11. We say that equilibrium E0 risk dominates equilib-
rium E1 when LA0 LB0 > LA1 LB1.
Harsanyi and Selten provide an axiomatic justification for the criterion. Risk dom-
inance is the only equilibrium selection criterion that is not affected by a relabeling
of strategies and players, nor by a change of the payoffs that maintains the struc-
ture of the best response correspondence, nor by strengthening the payoffs of the
selected equilibrium.
Besides the intuition and the axiomatization provided by Harsanyi and Selten, there
are more theoretical and empirical reasons why risk dominance could be consid-
ered a good equilibrium selection criterion. In evolutionary models (like Kandori,
Mailath and Rob 1993, Young 1993 and Fudenberg and Harris 1992) with noise
due to random shocks to payoffs, or to mutation/experimentation by new or unin-
formed players, observed play follows a stochastic process. The limiting distribu-
tion of that stochastic process when the noise is small puts most of the weight in
the state where all agents are playing according to the risk dominant equilibrium.
This happens because the likelihood of a stationary state depends on the size of the
shock needed to escape from it, and the size of the shock needed to escape an equi-
librium (the only stationary states) depends on the size of the area for which the
equilibrium strategies are best responses. Risk dominant equilibria are precisely
those with the largest best response areas.
5We change the order of the strategies with respect to the example in the previous paragraph for
consistence with the game of quality choice, where the strategies have a natural ordering in terms
of quality levels.
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Another theoretical argument in favor of risk dominance arises in games with some
uncertainty about the payoffs. Suppose players are not completely sure whether
the game played is actually one with two strict equilibria (although this is the most
likely event) or one where either U or V are strictly dominant. The only equilibria
of the game with that type of uncertainty is such that both players play the strategies
from the risk dominant equilibrium in the game without uncertainty (Carlsson and
Van Damme 1993).
Perhaps the most appealing argument for risk dominance is that in the experimental
evidence available so far, like the papers of Guyer and Rapoport (1972) and Van
Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) 6 we cite in the introduction, the risk dominant
equilibrium is chosen by the subjects.
Let us now apply the risk dominance criterion to our model. Denote by E0 the
equilibrium where the low cost firm is the leader and by E1 the equilibrium where
the high cost firm is the leader. Recall that A is the low cost firm and B is the high
cost firm.
In our case a00 = π1A(u∗∗1 ,u∗2 ), a01 = π1A(u∗1,u∗2 ), a10 = π2A(u∗∗2 ,u∗∗1 ), a11 = π1A
(u∗1 , u
∗∗
2 ), b00 = π2B(u∗∗1 ,u∗2 ), b01 = π2B(u∗1,u∗2 ), b10 = π1B(u∗∗2 ,u∗∗1 ) and b11 =
π2B(u
∗
1,u
∗∗
2 ).
In our case, LA0 is what player A gains by forecasting rightly that the other player
will play the equilibrium where A itself is the leader, instead of forecasting wrongly
that the other equilibrium holds. LA1 represents the gains for player A of forecast-
ing rightly that the other player will play the equilibrium where B is the leader. The
interpretation of LB1 and LB2 is analogous.
Figure 3 shows that we have LA0 ≥ LB1 and LB0 ≥ LA1, and the equality only
holds when k = 1, that is, when both firms have identical costs of quality. Thus,
for the game we are studying the risk dominance criterion selects the equilibrium
where the leader is the lower cost firm.
Equilibrium selection can be interpreted in a strong way and in a weaker way. The
strong interpretation is that we will never (or rarely) observe players choosing the
strategies that lead to an equilibrium that is not selected. The weaker interpreta-
tion is that the likelihood of observing players using the strategies that lead to each
equilibrium is related to the “degree” of risk dominance. To make this more pre-
cise we propose the measure of this degree to be LA0 LB0LA1 LB1+LA0 LB0 . Notice that this
ratio is invariant to affine transformations of the payoffs, so it can be used to mea-
sure the strength or degree of risk dominance. The larger this ratio, the more risk
6For an interpretation of these results from an adaptive learning perspective, see Crawford
(1995) and Broseta (1993)
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dominated E1 is, and so the likelier it is that we will observe players using the E0
strategies. We feel that the weaker hypothesis is more reasonable, not only because
it is more difficult to reject, but also because most of the reasons in favor of risk
dominance involve uncertainty or bounded rationality (see Harsanyi and Selten,
1988, p.89), and in these circumstances it would be hard to expect the strong hy-
pothesis to be satisfied. Our interpretation is supported by the experimental data
we describe below.
3.2 Risk dominance in the game with more than two strategies
We consider a 2 player game, G, where the strategy space for player i = A, B is
Ui (in our case the qualities), and the payoff function is πi : UA ×UB →.
Extending risk dominance to games with more than 2 strategies proceeds by first
postulating a theory of preliminary expectations and then using the tracing proce-
dure to arrive at one of the two equilibria from those expectations. Since the risk
dominance criterion assumes that only one of two equilibrium strategy pairs will
be played, only strategies that are somehow connected with the equilibrium strate-
gies should be a part of the preliminary expectations. To do this more formally, let
us define a game G′ as a formation of G if the set U′A ×U ′B formed by reducing the
strategy sets from the original game and maintaining the payoff function is closed
with respect to best replies in G. In other words, G′ is a formation of G if
∀uj ∈ U ′j Bi(uj ) ⊆ U ′i , i, j = A, B; j 	= i, (6)
where Bi is the best response correspondence of agent i for game G. Let u∗ and u∗∗
be two equilibrium points. Let F be the smallest formation7 such that u∗ and u∗∗
belong to the strategy sets in F . F will be the game used for the risk dominance
comparison between u∗ and u∗∗.
The preliminary expectations used by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) are given by the
bicentric priors. For every z with 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and for i = 1,2 define
rzi = ai(zv j + (1− z)v′j ), j 	= i (7)
where ai is the centroid of the best response correspondence for i and z is some
probability that i could assign to the equilibrium v. The centroid of a set U′i is a
mixed strategy c such that c(ui )= 1/|U ′i | if ui ∈U ′i and c(ui )= 0 otherwise; where
|U ′i | is the number of elements in U′i . rzi is a best response for player i if she believes
7Such a set exists because the intersection of two formations is a formation.
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j will play v j with probability z and v′j with probability 1− z. The bicentric prior
of player j about player i strategy will be defined then as follows:
pi(ui ) =
∫ 1
0
rzi (ui )dz, for every ui ∈ Ui (8)
Player j does not know what probability player i assigns to v j and v′j , so player
j will (adopting the principle of insufficient reason) give the same weight to all
possible z for player i.
These bicentric priors represent the initial expectations of each player about the
other player’s strategy. These expectations need not be consistent with the actual
strategy the other player intends to play given her preliminary expectations, and
thus the best responses to preliminary expectations need not be equilibria. The best
responses to preliminary expectations will be used by the tracing procedure to start
a path that will smoothly approach one equilibrium which will be the one selected
by the risk dominance criterion.
The (linear) tracing procedure is defined as follows: for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let the game
t be the game with the same strategy sets as F , and whose payoff functions are
defined by
πti(ui,uj ) = tπi (ui,uj )+ (1− t)πi(ui, pj ), i, j = A, B, j 	= i (9)
where πi is the payoff function in F and p are the bicentric priors. Clearly 1 = F
and 0 is the game where each player is facing her preliminary expectations.
For any game t let Et be the set of equilibrium points in t and let X = X(F, p)
the graph of the correspondence t → Et for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. A continuous path L con-
tained in X connecting point x0 = (0,u0 ) and x1 = (1,u1 ) (where ut is an equilib-
rium oft, t = 0,1), is called a feasible path. The linear tracing procedure consists
in selecting an equilibrium of a game F which is the strategy part u1 of the end-
point (1,u1 ) of a feasible path L. The linear tracing procedure is well defined if X
contains one and only one feasible path. Take a pair (F, p) for which the tracing
procedure is well defined and let u1 be the equilibrium selected. We denote then
T(F, p) = u1.
We say that an equilibrium v risk dominates v′ if, given a bicentric prior p, and a
reduced game F , T(F, p) = v.
We have computed numerically the preliminary expectations and then applied the
tracing procedure for a game with payoff functions like the ones in section 2 and
strategy spaces reduced to the two equilibrium strategies and one hundred convex
combinations of them. We find that for all the parameter values for which we do
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the computation (k = 1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5 and notice that for k > 1.5 there is a
unique equilibrium) the equilibrium with the low cost firm being the leader is one
selected by risk dominance in all the cases. Table 2 reports the results of the tracing
procedure. For selected values of t between 0 and 18 we show the equilibrium val-
ues of the auxiliary games. One can easily see that there is only one path connect-
ing the equilibrium of the game with the preliminary expectations and the actual
game played. This path is the constant path that already starts at the equilibrium
values of quality for leadership by the low cost firm. For sufficiently high values
of t another path arises, which finally connects with the other equilibrium. This
level of t is higher as the value of k rises. This is similar to the rising value of the
degree of risk dominance, LA0 LB0LA1 LB1+LA0 LB0 , we defined for 2× 2 games, and can be
interpreted as saying that the equilibrium where the low cost firm is the leader is
“more” risk dominant as the cost asymmetry increases.
4 Experimental design
In the experiments we chose to restrict the number of strategies to two. There are
several reasons for this. Firstly, we have shown that risk dominance selects the
same equilibrium in the game with 2 strategies per player as well as in a game with
a much less coarser discretization of the strategy space. Besides, by reducing the
dimensionality in this way we partly compensate for the problems created by the
smaller incentives that agents have in laboratory experiments (computational com-
plexity would justify a more careful behaviour in the real world, where both time
available and the payoffs are likely to be higher). It is also unclear whether the
smaller strategy space entails a departure from realism. Using a continuum of lev-
els of quality allows us to use calculus tools which greatly simplify the theoretical
analysis, but it may be that two quality levels comes closer to the available number
of strategies in the real world case.
The game played in the experiment was a 2× 2 bimatrix game. Each agent chose
one of two actions; 0 or 1. There were two types of players; A and B. The role
of the subjects was randomly assigned to them at the beginning of the session and
was not changed for the duration of the session. The game was played for 25 or
30 periods depending on the session. Each player was randomly matched with an
anonymous opponent after every period. The agents were informed of the mumber
of times the game was played and they had two initial practice sessions for which
they received no payment. The payoffs were given by payoff matrices in table 1,
which were known to all the players, so the game was one of complete information.
8We only report 10 values of t, but the computations were done for 100.
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These matrices are derived from the model we analyzed in section 2, as we specify
below.
The experiments were conducted using 6 or 7 subjects of each type, depending
on the session. The subjects were undergraduate students in the Faculties of Eco-
nomics and Business and of Humanities at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.
Players were seated at separate computer terminals and given a copy of the instruc-
tions which can be found in the appendix translated to English (the originals were
in Spanish). They could ask questions if they did not understand the instructions,
but there were essentially no questions, other than about how to read the payoff
matrix.
To induce the payoffs in terms of utility and control for risk aversion we used the
binary lottery procedure, (see Roth-Malouf (1979)). Each player received the pay-
off in points which then determine the probability of receiving a monetary prize.
At the end of each period we conducted a lottery in which winning players received
a prespecified prize, and the losers received nothing. The probability of winning
was given by the number of points divided by 1000. This procedure guarantees
that expected utility maximizers will try to maximize the number of points inde-
pendently of their attitudes towards risk 9. We resorted to this procedure because
risk dominance is a concept which is not invariant to risk aversion. It is possible
to find examples of risk preferences in our game such that if you write the ma-
trix for the game in terms of monetary payoffs (that is, if agents are risk neutral)
one equilibrium dominates but for other risk preferences the risk dominant equi-
librium is a different one. This led us to control for risk aversion, even though
some authors question the general validity of the procedure (see Selten, Sadrieh
and Abbink 1995, and the remarks on the use of the binary lottery by Roth in the
introduction to Kagel and Roth (1995)). To see if the use of this procedure could
bias the results we ran some control sessions (7 and 8) where points were converted
into pesetas (the Spanish currency) at a fixed deterministic exchange rate, which
was known to the experimental subjects. There were no major qualitative changes
in behavior in those control sessions.
Sessions 2, 4 and 6 were run right after 1, 3 and 5 respectively and the same subjects
were used. A new matrix was drawn and the subjects’ roles were drawn randomly
again. They were asked to play another 25 periods10 This was done to test for ex-
9Notice that expected utility is invariant with respect to affine transformations, so by normaliz-
ing the utility of the prize to 1000 and the utility of no prize to 0 the expected utility is equal to the
expected number of points.
10When subjects played only one session, this lasted 30 periods. When subjects played two sub-
sequent sessions, each of them lasted 25 periods. This was done to shorten the time they had to
devote to the experiment.
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perience effects with a different matrix. Indeed it turns out that previous experi-
ence made players coordinate more easily in the new game, even though subjects
were assigned different roles than in the previous session and a different matrix
was chosen to play.
The agents saw on their screens the history of actions and outcomes of the matches
they had been in, which was automatically updated after every period. They knew
what they had played and what their different opponents had played in every pe-
riod, and how much they had earned in every period, both in terms of points and in
terms of pesetas, as well as their cumulated pesetas. But they did not know what the
history of their opponents was, nor had they any aggregate statistic of how many
players had chosen every strategy in every period. We chose this design to avoid
that expectations were too easily coordinated, which might decrease the informa-
tiveness of the individuals’ actions.
The payoffs of the game, shown on table 1, correspond to the payoffs for equilib-
rium strategies in the vertical product differentiation game described in section 2,
after a renormalization to make the numbers fall between 0 and 1000. This renor-
malization makes it easier for the subjects to understand the conversion of points
into probabilities in the binary lottery procedure. We used six matrices, numbered
1 to 6, which correspond respectively to the values of k ∈ {1,1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5}.
Recall that for k = 1 the game is symmetric and that the asymmetries rise with the
value of k. For all matrices, strategy 0 is the level of quality chosen by a firm in
the equilibrium in which that firm produces the higher quality and strategy 1 is the
level of quality in the equilibrium in which that firm produces the lower quality.
The payoffs in the matrix are the renormalized payoffs corresponding to the pay-
offs each firm would earn in the model described in section 2. For instance, in
matrix 3 the pair (0,0) would represent the situation where player A is playing the
quality level 25.28 and B is playing 23.08 and k = 1.2, and the payoffs are the ones
that correspond to this strategy profile (which is not an equilibrium). Notice that
k < 1.56 so we are considering only situations where both equilibria exist. The
subjects, however, were not informed about the economic interpretation in terms
of a quality choice game so as not to bias their perception in terms of the “prestige”
possibly associated to producing a high quality.
There are two pure strategy equilibria independently of the matrix used (i.e. inde-
pendently of the value of k), and they are (0,1) and (1,0). The former equilibrium
is the risk dominant one (except in the symmetric case of matrix 1).
Table 3 summarizes session numbers, payoff matrices used, whether the session
had experienced players (in brackets the session where the same subjects had played)
and whether the session used the binary lottery procedure or not.
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5 The data and results
Table 4 and Figure 4 summarize the results obtained with the pooled data from the
12 experiments 11. In Figure 4, as in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8, we compute a cubic re-
gression curve with 95 % confidence intervals for each type of equilibrium, in order
to identify graphically the incidence of the two types of equilibrium. Graphically,
it can be seen that equilibrium (0,1) was played more often than (1,0), thus the risk
dominance criterion makes the right prediction more often. We also computed a
sign rank statistic to test whether the difference between the number of equilibria
(0,1) minus the number of equilibria (1,0) is greater than 0 12. We pooled the
observations for groups of 5 periods. The results are reported in Table 5, also pro-
viding evidence that the number of risk dominant equilibria is larger.
As we noted in section 3 the degree of risk dominance can be measured by the ra-
tio LA0 LB0LA1 LB1+LA0 LB0 , which is an increasing function of k as can be seen from Figure
3. It is clear that the proportion of times for which the risk dominant equilibrium
is played increases with k as can be seen in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8, somehow con-
firming the weaker interpretation of risk dominance we proposed. We confirmed
this graphic visualization by running a t–test of the hypothesis that the difference
in the number of equilibria is linearly increasing with k, which is an increasing
function of the degree of risk dominance of the equilibrium (1,0) of the matrices.
We also divided the periods in sequences of 5. The results are reported in Table 6.
The results strongly show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the difference
is linearly increasing.
We replicated the experiments based on Matrices 5 and 6, and the results can be
seen in Figure 6. The replication of the experiment based on matrix 6 gives very
similar results to the original. The replication of the experiment based on matrix
5 runs more in accordance with the prediction of risk dominance than the original.
The only difference between the original experiment and the replication is that the
total number of periods was extended from 25 to 30, but the behavior at period 25
is already different enough to consider improbable that this is cause for the differ-
ence. Another experiment with matrix 5 was performed without using the binary
lottery procedure. The results, which can be seen in Figure 8 also show a clear
prevalence of the risk dominant equilibrium.
We also checked for experience effects, and the results are shown in Figure 7. We
run an experiment with matrix 2 based on subjects experienced on matrix 5. In
contrast with the unexperienced subjects that are confronted with matrix 2, which
11Figure 4 also includes the two trial periods performed in each session
12The details for this and all subsequents tests are shown in the Appendix B.
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tend to produce an outcome in favor of the risk dominant equilibrium (see Fig-
ure 5), in this case the outcome goes in favor of the (1,0) equilibrium as in the
original experiment with matrix 5. Matrix 3 is run with subjects experienced in
matrix 6. In this case, both the experienced and the unexperienced subjects, chose
more often the risk dominant equilibrium, but the subjects who had experienced
matrix 6 did it even more often than the unexperienced players. Matrix 4 is run
with subjects experienced in matrix 1. In the two cases where the matrix was run
with and without experience (matrices 2 and and 3) the subjects behaved signif-
icantly differently in the experience treatment than in the original treatment, and
in the experience treatment they moved towards the outcome observed in the pre-
vious game they game had played, but their behavior was not identical as in the
previous game. This means that experience with a different matrix is an important
factor in explaining behavior but it is not determinant; the degree of risk dominance
is important even with experienced subjects.
Finally we check for the effects of the lottery mechanism that we used in the ex-
periments. Comparing Figure 8 with the original matrix, we can see that the preva-
lence of the risk dominant equilibrium seems to get reinforced if the lottery mech-
anism is not used. Note, however, that strictly speaking what we observe without
the lottery procedure is that the equilibrium which would be risk dominant under
risk neutrality is played more often than with the lottery procedure.
Table 4 also shows that that while type A agents (those endowed with an advan-
tage) choose strategy 0 (high quality) almost all the time (from matrix 3 upwards
never less than 70 percent of the time) type B agents choose action 0 over 40 per-
cent of the time except for matrix 6. This is consistent with their “punishing” or
trying to teach the leaders to play their favorite equilibrium and is reminiscent of
similar results in bargaining experiments (see Gu¨th, Schmittberger and Schwarze
1982, Binmore, Shaked and Sutton 1989 and Roth’s survey in Kagel and Roth
1995) which are distantly connected with this game.
6 Learning models
Since some of the theoretical models that lend support to risk dominance as an
equilibrium selection criterion are learning or evolutionary models we would like
to present here some evidence as to whether agents learn in this game and which
model fits the data best.
As a benchmark rule, we assume that agents could play always the same mixed
strategy. In that case, the strategy can be estimated with the average observed play
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of an agent. Then we estimate other learning models and we obtain the Quadratic
Deviation Measure (QDM), which is basically a sum of squared errors. Tang (1996)
and Chen and Tang (1996) use this methodology and learning models for other
games, and their results are similar to ours in terms of which models produce the
smaller quadratic deviations.
Let pij(t) the probability with which an agent i of type j chooses strategy 1 at time
t. Let xij (t) be the actual choice of agent i of type j at time t.
The quadratic deviation of agent i of type j at time t is,
QDMij(t) = (xij(t)− pij(t))2
Let I be the number of players and T be the number of periods in a given session.
The average quadratic deviation for the players is
QDM =
I∑
i=1
∑
j=A,B
T∑
t=1
(xij(t)− pij(t))2
2I
The benchmark model (B) is the individual stationary mixed-strategy model. This
benchmark predicts that agents will choose a constant randomization which can be
estimated as the actual observed frequency of play, that is, we propose that
pij(t) = p¯ij
where the estimate of p¯ is pˆ =∑t xij (t)/T .
The first learning model we have fitted to the data is a learning by reinforcement
(LR) model (see Roth and Erev 1994, Bo¨rgers and Sarin 1997). Define by uij(t)
the payoff actually received by agent i of type j at period t, xkij(t) is an indicator
function that is 1 if strategy k was used by agent i of type j at time t and 0 otherwise
and Rkij (t) is the “propensity” to play strategy k.
Rkij(t) = qRkij (t − 1)+ xkij(t)uij (t)
where q is a parameter that measures how past information is discounted.
Notice that a strategy which is not played does not increase its “propensity”. The
learning model predicts that strategy 0 will be played with probability
pij(t) =
R0ij(t)
R0ij(t)+ R1ij(t)
.
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We estimate the parameter q with a grid from 0 to 1.
The other model we estimate is modified fictitious play with experimentation (MFP).
Let o0ij(t) be an indicator function that is 1 if strategy 0 was used by the opponent
of agent i of type j at time t and 0 otherwise. We assume that each agent i of type
j forms beliefs about the probability that her opponent will use strategy 0, which
we denote by qij(t),
qij(t) = (1− λ(t))qij (t)+ λ(t)o0i j (s)
where λ(t) = α+ β/t. Let BR(qij (t)) be the set of best responses to qij(t). Then
pij(t) =


1− δ if BR(qij (t)) = 0
δ if BR(qij (t)) = 1
γ if BR(qij (t)) = {0,1}
so that we have fictitious play strictly speaking when α = 0, β = 1, and δ= 0; and
best response dynamics when α = 1, β = 0, and δ = 0. The parameter δ adds a
measure of randomness which can accommodate evolutionary stories as in Kan-
dori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993).
As can be easily seen from table 7, the benchmark model performs better (has a
lower QDM) than either of the learning models that we estimate. Note, however
that the benchmark has more parameters (one per individual) than the others, and
that the learning by reinforcement model has only slightly higher QDM than the
benchmark (in fact, in the first session the QDM of reinforcement is lower than for
the benchmark). In contrast, the modified fictitious play has a quite higher QDM
than even the reinforcement model, which has less parameters, for all sessions.
This results reproduce quite closely the ones of Chen and Tang (1996) and Tang
(1996), and warrant the conclusion that fictitious play is not a good learning model
in this game and that the reinforcement model seems more adequate.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have used the risk dominance criterion to select among multiple
equilibria in a vertical differentiation model with two firms. In the theoretical anal-
ysis, it turns out that risk dominance selects the equilibrium where the high quality
is produced by the firm which has some advantage.
To test for the plausibility of this equilibrium selection, we gathered experimen-
tal evidence on a coordination game that reproduces the features of the economic
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model we analyze. We find that the risk dominance criterion is supported by the
behavior of the experimental subjects in the sense that the strategies that form part
of such an equilibrium are selected more often than the others. Furthermore, the
predictive power of the risk dominance criterion increases with the size of the ini-
tial asymmetries.
These results suggest that further research should be devoted to risk dominance,
as a tool to increase the predictive power of theory, even if (as in our case) it is
not a perfect predictor of the outcome. An important question is whether the re-
sult that risk dominant equilibria happen more often than other equilibria is due
to prior introspective reasoning by rational agents as Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
originally proposed or whether it is the result of evolution and learning, as in Kan-
dori, Mailath and Rob (1993) or Young (1993). In the game we have studied the
two approaches coincide but this need not be the case in general. If the two the-
ories do not lead to the same predictions, more experiments could help to choose
between them.
More research on the general topic of equilibrium selection for games like the ones
we study is also necessary. Harsanyi (1995) proposes a new theory of equilibrium
selection which is connected to risk dominance, but permits multilateral compar-
isons. Selten (1995) studies a new definition of risk dominance for games with two
strict equilibria where the difference in payoffs of strategies of one player are linear
in the mixed strategies of other players. He shows that the measure is (essentially)
the only one that satisfies a set of axioms and applies the criterion for some games.
Both theories will lead to the same predictions in 2 × 2 games like the ones on
which we did experiments, but they lead to different predictions in general. Again,
more empirical evidence is needed to discriminate between the concepts.
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Appendix A: Instructions for the Game (translated from
Spanish)
General
You are going to participate in an experiment on an economic game. Just for partic-
ipating you will receive 500 pesetas13. Besides that, if you follow the instructions
carefully and you take adequate decisions you may win a considerable amount of
money which will be paid to you in cash after the experiment. It is important that
you do not communicate with your neighbors. If you have questions raise your
hands and one of us will come to you and will answer your questions.
The experiment will consist of a series of decision periods. In each period you
will be randomly and anonymously matched with another person and depending
on the action you choose and the action chosen by the person with whom you are
matched you will receive some points. After receiving those points they will be
converted into an amount of pesetas which will depend on the number of points
you have. We will begin by explaining the conversion of points into pesetas so that
you understand the effect of the points obtained in the amount of pesetas earned.
After that we will explain the choice of actions in detail so that you understand
how to obtain the points.
Conversion of points into pesetas14
At the end of each period you will have obtained an amount of points between 0 and
1000 according to the system we will explain later. The computer will randomly
choose an integer number between 1 and 1000 (giving all numbers the same prob-
ability). If the number of points you have is larger than or equal to the number
obtained by the computer you win 50 pesetas. If the number of points you have
is smaller than the number obtained by the computer you win 0 pesetas. For ex-
ample, if you have 450 points you have a 45% probability of winning 50 pesetas.
It is important that you realize that the larger the number of points you obtain, the
larger the probability of winning.
13Spanish currency
14This paragraph obviously did not appear in the sessions where we did not correct for risk
aversion
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Choice of actions
There are two types of players. At the beginning of the experiment the computer
will tell you which type of player you are. You will keep this type for the duration
of the experiment.
The experiment will be composed of 30 decision periods. In each period you will
be randomly matched with a player of the other type. In this way all pairs will be
composed of a type A player and a type B player. The identity of you couple is
unknown to you and it changes every period randomly.
Once the period begins each player can choose between two options: 0 and 1. The
points obtained will be a function of your choice and the independent choice of
you couple, as indicated in the following example:
Table 5:
Choice of B
0 1
Choice 0 292, 164 612, 362
of A 1 364, 509 367, 346
For instance, to know the points you have obtained if you are type A and you choose
0 when the person you are matched with (therefore a type B) chooses 1, you look
in the table for the cell corresponding to (A, 0), (B, 1) and you find the number
612. In this same situation your pair obtains 362, as one can see from the same
cell (A, 0), (B, 1) of the table. You can find the table for this experiment at the end
of these instructions.
Once you decide on your action you should enter you decision in the computer.
Once you and the player you are matched with have taken the decision, the com-
puter will determine the number of points earned, using the corresponding table.
The computer will tell you this information.
After that, the computer converts the point into pesetas. Once this is done the com-
puter will tell you this information together with the history of your decisions and
those of the player with whom you have been matched.
History of decisions
The computer gives you a history of the decisions you have taken in previous pe-
riods, as well as those of the players you were matched with and how many points
and pesetas you won.
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Development of the experiment
At the beginning of the experiment you will have two practice rounds to get used
to the terminal and the game. The gains of those periods are fictitious and will not
be paid at the end. Once the practice rounds are over the true experiment begins,
where the gains are real. The experiment will consist of 30 true periods.
Appendix B: Details for the statistical tests
For the sign rank test reported in table 5, we first computed the total number of
(0,1) and (1,0) equilibria and we then computed the difference between these
two scores for each experiment and each period. We then grouped the periods in
sequences of 5, and computed the sign rank statistic as S = p − n/2, where p is
the number of values greater than 0 and n is the number of nonzero values. Under
the null hypothesis that the median of the difference is zero, the probability that the
sign statistic is greater or equal then the observed value is 2
∑min{p,n−p}
j=0
(
n
j
)
0.5n.
For the linear trend test reported in table 6, we computed the difference as in the
previous test, and we computed the centered trend coefficients, which are then used
to form a t − statistic to contrast the within-group means. The p-values were ad-
justed using a bootstrap method.
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Table 1:
Matrix 1: Matrix 2:
Choice of B
0 1
Choice 0 29, 29 594, 365
of A 1 365, 594 338, 338
Choice of B
0 1
Choice 0 123, 78 600, 364
of A 1 365, 567 348, 341
Matrix 3: Matrix 4:
Choice of B
0 1
Choice 0 193, 114 604, 363
of A 1 365, 545 356, 343
Choice of B
0 1
Choice 0 248, 142 608, 362
of A 1 364, 526 362, 345
Matrix 5: Matrix 6:
Choice of B
0 1
Choice 0 292, 164 612, 362
of A 1 364, 509 367, 346
Choice of B
0 1
Choice 0 327, 181 615, 361
of A 1 364, 496 371, 347
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Table 2:
k = 1.1
t 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
uA uB 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49 25.28 4.49
4.70 23.08 4.70 23.08 4.70 23.08 4.70 23.08 4.70 23.08 4.70 23.08 4.70 23.08 4.70 23.08 4.70 23.08
k = 1.2
t 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
uA uB 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20 25.25 4.20
4.59 20.65
4.59 21.03 4.59 21.03
4.59 21.20 4.59 21.20 4.59 21.20 4.59 21.20 4.59 21.20
k = 1.3
t 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
uA uB 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94 25.22 3.94
4.48 17.41
4.48 18.19
4.48 18.67
4.48 19.14
4.48 19.45
4.48 19.61
k = 1.4
t 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
uA uB 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71 25.19 3.71
4.37 16.79
4.37 17.37
4.37 17.81
4.37 18.25
k = 1.5
t 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
uA uB 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50 25.17 3.50
4.48 15.98
4.27 16.52
4.27 17.07
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Table 3:
Number Matrix Experience (and previous RM
session when experienced)
1 5 No Yes
2 2 Yes, 1 Yes
3 6 No Yes
4 3 Yes, 3 Yes
5 1 No Yes
6 4 Yes, 5 Yes
7 5 No No
8 2 No No
9 6 No Yes
10 5 No Yes
11 2 No Yes
12 3 No Yes
Table 4:
Matrix % of (0,1) % of (1,0) % of (0,0) % of (1,1)
All 41.6 17.5 27.7 13.2
1 15.5 41.0 16.8 26.7
2 26.2 28.8 31.9 13.1
3 40.0 11.1 32.5 16.4
4 45.9 11.2 31.7 11.2
5 43.7 16.3 26.7 13.3
6 70.8 2.2 21.2 5.8
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Table 5: Sign Rank Statistic: H0 is that the difference between the number of equi-
libria (0,1) minus the number of equilibria (1,0) is greater than 0
Periods Number of observations P-value
Trial 24 0.17887
1-5 60 0.00029
6-10 60 0.00001
11-15 60 0.00037
16-20 60 0.00183
21-25 58 0.00301
26-30 29 0.00000
Table 6: Test for a linear trend increasing with the degree of asymmetry
Mean Difference
Periods Matrix 1 Matrix 2 Matrix 3 Matrix 4 Matrix 5 Matrix 6 Raw P-Value Adjusted P-Value
Trial 0.50 -1.00 2.25 0.00 0.67 3.00 0.1075 0.3000
1-5 0.20 -1.27 2.40 0.40 1.53 1.25 0.0001 0.0001
6-10 -2.00 0.60 1.70 1.60 2.53 4.90 0.0001 0.0001
11-15 -1.40 -0.73 2.40 1.20 2.27 4.00 0.0001 0.0001
16-20 -2.80 -0.80 2.40 4.00 1.00 5.40 0.0001 0.0001
21-25 -2.40 0.07 1.13 4.00 1.00 4.80 0.0001 0.0001
26-30 0.00 2.56 1.40 0.00 3.60 6.20 0.0001 0.0001
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Table 7:
Session Matrix QDM(B) QDM(LR) q(LR) QDM(MFP) q(M F P) δ(M FP)
Number
1 5 10.3 9.96 0.7 11.12 0.55 0.34
2 2 5.7 6.3 0.5 8.42 1 0.22
3 6 6.5 7.52 1 9.69 1 0.26
4 3 6.8 7.76 0.7 11.30 0.75 0.44
5 1 9.5 10.55 0.95 12.26 0 0.44
6 4 8.9 9.17 0.85 11.70 0.90 0.38
7 5 8.1 8.28 0.75 11.96 0.80 0.28
8 2 10.0 10.68 0.8 14.23 0.65 0.44
9 6 4.7 5.62 0.9 9.86 0.90 0.20
10 5 9.4 10.55 0.95 14.54 0.90 0.42
11 2 12.2 13.47 1 14.89 0.70 0.46
12 3 11.4 12.76 0.95 14.94 0.90 0.46
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Figure 1: Qualities and profits at the candidate equilibria as a function of the cost
efficiency gap, k. Left hand side: qualities (top) and profits (bottom) when firm A
is the high quality firm. Right hand side: qualities (top) and profits (bottom) when
firm B is the high quality firm.
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Figure 2: Profits of firm A, at the candidate equilibrium where it produces the low
quality, and when it optimally deviates from it to produce a higher quality
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Figure 3: Gain functions for equilibrium predictions
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Figure 4:
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Figure 5: Difference in Equilibria: Original Experiments
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Figure 6: Difference in Equilibria: Replications
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Figure 7: Difference in Equilibria: Experience Effects
40
Figure 8: Difference in Equilibria: Lottery Effects
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